Epistemological psychology is a multi-sided perspective in psychology uncovering simple primary hidden inklings (images) in ideas, actions, feelings and all social interactions.
The inkling is presumed to trigger an affect which encapsulates and saturates all human experience. In everyday life, inklings induce detection either via human enactments (through habitual behavior) or through spontaneous devotion (conscious expression in the arts).
The term episteme is related to the Greek word επιστήμη, which translates literally as standing near or by that which causes but is often simplified as knowledge or science. By ignoring ego interests the core impetus or the essence of a deed, real or imagined, is recovered.
Epistemology vs Psychology
If we want to hold onto the intuition that people can and do have contradictory beliefs but still recognize that there is something seriously wrong with creating a model that can handle contradictory beliefs in an epistemic context then it seems like such separation would be a possible way to account for this.
Questions continue to pop into my head. When psychology refers to belief and epistemology refers about belief are they talking about the same thing, “belief” just different aspects of it? or are these two distinct things?
I have been trying to think of the issue and realized there is very limited work done in the area. I have been able to come across an interesting paper by Alvin Goldman (“Relation between Epistemology and Psychology” Synthese 1985, Vol 64, p. 29-68) where he appears to give an interesting analysis of the topic. For the moment I am looking at his criticism of logic providing formal rules for epistemology. Goldman says “…so-called ‘rules of inference’ in axiomatic systems or natural deductive systems say nothing about beliefs, or other psychological states” (Goldman p. 42). I think it is important to notice that he has already defined beliefs as a psychological state. If we treat belief in a manner that has little or nothing to do with psychological states, which seems to be in line with someone like Timothy Williamson, “…the point of belief is knowledge” (Knowledge and its Limits p. 1), it would seem that if Williamson is right, beliefs are the kinds of things that point to knowledge then that doesn’t seem very relevant to psychology. The reason I say this is psychology (as far as I know) equates beliefs with behavior (John seemed to think this also). If beliefs are something other than behavior (which it seems like they are) then we cannot say that beliefs (in epistemic contexts) are a psychological state.